The Incomparable Value of the Individual
Kant believed that every human being should be treated as an end in itself. In the Groundwork, Kant explains many of our duties by arguing that their violation would involve treating a human being as a mere means.
But we cannot explain all of our duties that way. Nor can we explain what is wrong with treating an individual as a mere means unless we have a positive account of what is involved in being an end in itself. Kant does not spell out this positive account.
I find a clue to what Kant could mean in his claim that individuals who possess dignity have incomparable value. I propose that to treat someone as an end in itself is to evaluate the events and conditions of that person’s life in accordance with the value they have for her, and to regard that value as incomparable with the value those events and conditions might have for anyone else. I explain why this conception rules out the aggregation of value across the boundaries between individuals and show how it supports John Taurek’s attack on aggregation. I also explain how this conception of the value of the individual is connected to the idea that individuals have rights.
About the Law and Philosophy Workshop
The Law and Philosophy Workshop is jointly presented by the University of Michigan Philosophy Department and the School of Law. The public sessions feature presentations by leading or emerging voices in the fields of legal theory, moral or political philosophy to faculty members from the philosophy department, the law school, the history department, the Ross School of Business and the African-American Studies department, among others. The Workshop is open to the academic community.
Professors Nico Cornell ([email protected]) and Sarah Moss ([email protected]) organize the Workshop. If you would like to receive Workshop announcements, please contact Alex Wroble ([email protected]) and ask to have your name added to the workshop’s email list.
